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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
lN THE l\IATTER OF 11HE ESTATE 
OF 




BRI:bJF OF APPELLANT DAVID K. W ATKISS 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
This appeal is frmn a judgment of the trial court 
filed on Dece1nber 10, 1956 vacating and setting aside the 
Order appointing the administrator. 
The Order was Inade on petition of Fanners Mutual 
Autmnobile Insurance Cmnpany, a corporation. The 
basis of said petition is that it has a policy of public 
liability insurance which requires it to defend and pay 
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clain1s against the Estate of the deceased and would be 
put to great cost and expense in defending the action by 
Rawlinkiewicz. 
The grounds for voiding the Order appointing the 
adlninistrator was that there were no assets of Leigh 
within the State of Utah. 
Fr01n the order voiding the appoinbnent of David 
K. W atkiss as the ad1ninistrator of the Estate of Leigh 
this appeal has been taken. 
Throughout this brief the adn1inistrator will be re-
ferred to as appellant and the objector, Fanners Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Con1pany will be referred to as 
respondent. 
STATE!lENT OF FACTS 
Leigh died at Knolls, Tooele County, rtah on the 
29th day of .l\iay, 1955. At the ti1ne of her death she 
was a resident of the State of ::Minnesota. In the col-
lision causing the death of Leigh, Edward Rawlinkiewicz 
suffered serious personal injuries and da1nage to his 
autOinobile. 
Other than the wreeked autonwbile Leigh had no 
assets within the ~tate of Utah. On the 3rd of Noveinber, 
1955 a petition wa8 filed on behalf of Edward R.awlin-
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kiewicz for the appointluent of an adininistrator of the 
Estate of Leigh. The petition set forth the accident and 
the fact that no adn1inistrator had been appointed for 
Leigh and that there were assets within the State of Utah 
consisting of a public liability insurance policy cover-
ing the autouwbile that Leigh was driving. 
An order fixing a tiine for hearing was set. No ob-
jections were filed. Notice of hearing was given by the 
County Clerk of Tooele County to J. B. Hag1nan, Jr., 
representative, Insurance Adjushnent C01npany, Conti-
nental Bank Building, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
On the 22nd day of Dece1nber an order appointing 
David l{. Watkiss as the adininistrator was signed. 
On the 4th of January, 1956 the petition to revoke letters 
of adininistration was filed by respondent. 
The petition to revoke the letters of adininistration 
w.as heard before the Honorable R. L. Tuckett on the 
2nd of Nove1nber, 1956 and on Dece1nber lOth, 1956 the 
order was nmde voiding and vacating the order appoint-
ing the administrator. 
SL!l\ll\lAHY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN VOIDING AND VACATING 
THE ORDER APPOINTING THE ADMINISTRATOR. 
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A. THE PROBATE COURT HAS AUTHORITY TO APPOINT AN 
ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE PURPOSE OF ACQUIRING JURISDICTION OVER 
THE ESTATE SO THAT IT MAY BE PROPERLY ADMINISTERED. 
B. THE EXERCISE OF SOUND DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE 
PROBATE COURT REQUIRES THE APPOINTMENT OF AN ADMINISTRATOR 
OF THE ESTATE OF PHYLLIS ROSANDER LEIGH. 
POINT II 
RESPONDENT HAS COVENANTED TO DEFEND THE 
ACTION OF RAWLINKIEWICZ IN UTAH. 
POINT III 
THE LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE CAN ONLY BE SERVED 




THE COURT ERRED IN VOIDING AND VACATING 
THE ORDER APPOINTING THE ADMINISTRATOR. 
The order voiding and vacating the appointlnent of 
the adrninistrator statP~ that the b.a~i~ of the Court's 
adion was that thPre are no a~~Pt~ of the Estate within 
the State of Utah. 
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'rhi~ basic proposition was set forth in the petition 
of respondent to revoke the letters of administration and 
in .addition the petition set forth that since the respond-
ent was not authorized to do business within the State 
of Utah that the judg1nent which could be obtained 
against the ad1ninistrator of the Estate of Leigh by 
Rawlinkiewicz would be ineffectual for any purpose. 
The petition also pointed out that Rawlinkiewicz was 
seeking as the creditor of the Estate of Leigh to have 
an administrator appointed so that there would be within 
the State of Utah a person who could be sued and that 
only where the respondent was .authorized to do busi-
ness could there be any effectual means of collection 
instituted and a judg1nent obtained against it. 
The petition points out that the respondent would be 
put to great cost in order to defend the action instituted 
by Rawlinkiewicz. It apparently being the theory of 
respondent that the insurance c01npany should not be 
required to defend an action against their insured in 
any state except where they are authorized to do busi-
ness. 
~1_1he action c01n1nenced by Rawlinkiewicz against the 
ad1ninistrator of the Estate of Leigh was brought under 
the provision~ of Section 78-11-12 Utah Code Annotated, 
1953 which reads as follows : 
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"78-11-12. INJURY TO PER S 0 N OR 
DEATH-NO ABATEMENT OF CAUSE OJT 
ACTION UPON DEATH OF \VRONGDOER--
A C T I 0 N AGAINST PERSOXAL REPRE-
SENTATIVE OF \VROXGDOER-EVIDE1'CE 
REQUIRED. Causes of action arising out of 
physical injury to the person or death, caused by 
the wrongful act or negligence of another, shall 
not abate upon the death of the wrongdoer, and 
the injured person or the personal representatives 
or heirs of one meeting death, as above stated, 
shall have a cause of action against the personal 
representatives of the wrongdoer; provided, how-
ever, that the injured person or the personal 
representatives or heirs of one meeting death 
shall not recover judgment except upon sonw com-
petent satisfactory evidence other than the testi-
mony of said injured person." 
The jurisdictional statutes covering the .appointment 
of ad1ninistrators is Section 75-1-:2 Utah Code Annotated, 
1953 which reads as follows: 
"75-1-2. \VHERE \YILLS PROVED, AXD 
LETTERS nRAKTED. \\~ills 1nust be proved 
and letters testamentary or of ad1ninistration 
granted: 
(1) If the decedent w.as a resident of the 
statP, in the county in which he had his residence 
at the tin1e of his death. 
(2) lf the decedent was a nonresident of the 
state: first, in the county in which he may haYe 
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died leaving estate therein; second, in any coun-
ty in which any part of the estate may be, the 
decedent not having left estate in the county in 
which he died, or having died without the state. 
( 3) In all other cases, in the county where 
application for letters is first made." 
What the Legislature intended, when a resident 
person is injured by a negligent non-resident deceased, 
is the basic question presented by this appeal. 
The Inechanics of just how this action IS to be 
brought was not covered cmnpletely by the survival 
statute, Section 78-11-12, however, the Utah Law, as 
it has developed, n1akes unnecessary any additional pro-
vision. Section 75-1-2 had been on the books of the State 
of Utah for many years and has been the subject of 
nu1nerous decisions concerning jurisdiction of the Pro-
bate Court. 
A. THE PROBATE COURT HAS AUTHORITY TO AP-
POINT AN ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE PURPOSE OF AC-
QUIRING JURISDI·CTION OVER THE ESTATE SO THAT 
IT MAY BE PROPERLY ADMINISTERED. 
This Court has, on two separate occasions, had 
before it contentions that the Probate Court did not 
have jurisdiction to appoint an administrator because 
there were no asset~ within the State. Both cases de-
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cided that it was not necessary that there be property 
within the State of Utah in order to appoint an ad-
ministrator for the deceased person. Both cases inter-
pret Subsection 3 of Section 75-1-2 which reads as fol-
lows: 
"(3) In all other case~, in the county where 
application for letters is first made." 
to mean that in cases where there is no property appoint-
rnent can be rnade where application is first rnade. 
The first c.ase to discuss the rnatter was In re 
Tasanen's Estate, :25 Utah 396, 71 Pac. 984. In Tasanen's 
estate a non-resident of the State of Utah ·was suing a 
non-resident corporation which was doing business with-
in the State. Utah Savings and Trust Company had 
been appointed the adrninistrator of the estate of de-
ceased non-resident. Objection 'IYas rnade upon the 
grounds there was no jurisdiction to rnake the appoint-
rnent. It was clairned and conceded that the undisputed 
evidence disclosed that the deceased was not a resident 
of Weber County, State of Ptah, and did not leaYe an 
estate within the State of Vtah. The Diamond Coal & 
Coke Cornpany which petitioned to set aside and vacate 
the order appointing Utah SaYings .and TruM Cornpany 
as the adrninistrator set forth as a basis that there was 
no pstate or assets within {Ttah whieh could be admin-
ist<>r<'d and as a eonsPqH<-'IH'e that the District Court of 
\VPIH·r County w.as without jurisdietion to appoint a~ 
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administrator for the deceased r_rasanen. '11he district 
court sustained the ad1ninistrator and the Dianwnd 
Coal & {joke Cmnpany appealed. The Court set up the 
lJa~ic questions in the following language: 
''The Inain questions to be decided in this case 
.are: (1) Can the district court appoint an ad-
Ininistrator of the estate of a nonresident de-
ceased, where the only assets of said estate con-
sist of a right of action against a resident of 
this state, or ( 2) in case there are no assets at 
alH 
"Section 377 ± of the Revised Statutes of Utah 
of 1898 reads as follows : 
'Wills umst be proved and letters testa-
Inentary or of ad1ninistration granted: 
'(1) If the decedent be a resident of the 
state, in the county in which he had his resi-
dence at the tiine of his death. 
'(2) If the decedent be a non-resident of 
the state: First, in the county in which he 
Inay have died leaving estate therein; second, 
in any county in which any part of the estate 
Inay be, the decedent not having left estate 
in the county in which he died, or having 
died without the state. 
' ( 3) In all other cases, in the county 
where application for letters is first made.' 
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"The authorities seein to be divided on the 
question of whether a claim for death by wrong-
ful act is an asset of the estate of the deceased. 
We think the weight, however, leans to the side 
that it is. In view of the last paragraph of sec-
tion 377 4 we deern it is not necessary to follow 
either line, as the Legislature evidently had in 
mind cases in which the deceased ·was not .a resi-
dent, nor did he leave property in this state. We 
think that the case at bar is covered by this pro-
vision of the statute. If there should be nothing 
which the administrator could legally do, it could 
harm nobody. If there should be something which 
an administrator ought to do, then the appoint-
ment would be necessary. 
"We hold that the appoinhnent of the re-
spondent as administrator by the district court 
was correct, and the action of the lower court 
in refusing to set aside the appointment "·as cor-
rect, and it is hereby affirrned, ''ith costs." 
The language of the third sub-~ection of 73-1-:2 i~ 
the same as the language interpreted in Tasanen Estate. 
It is subruitted that the Tasanen decision i~ conclu~ive 
as to jurisdiction of the Pro bate Court to appoint an 
adrninistrator. 
~inee Ta~mwn there lw~ been one additional inter-
pretation of tlH' ~Pction hy the Court. It is In re Lozr-
ham's /•.~'state, 30 Utah ~;{(), S3 Pae. ±!5. The Court 
SlH~ei l'ieall~· affinned the holding whieh it had made 
in thP Ta~<UIPH decision. The language in the Lowham 
cast' is .as follows: 
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"'While a clai1n for damages for death by 
wrongful act is not a general asset of the estate 
under the foregoing provisions of the Wyoming 
statutes, we think it is a sufficient as.set of the 
estate for the purpose of appointing an admin-
istrator. This court, in effect, so held in the case 
of In re Estate of Tasanen, 25 Utah 396, 71 Pac. 
984. The doctrine declared in that case is not 
only in harmony with the great weight of author-
ity, but is, we think, supported by the better rea-
son. Brown v. Railroad Co., 97 Ky. 228, 30 S.W. 
639; Findlay v. Railroad Co., 106 Mich. 700, 64 
N.W. 732; Hutchins v. Railroad Co., 44 Minn. 5, 
46 N.W. 79; Merkle v. Bennington (Mich.) 35 
N.W. 846; Griswold v. Griswold (Ala) 29 South. 
-1:37; Railway Co. c. Reeves (Ind.App.) 35 N.E. 
199; Robertson v. Railroad Co., (Wis.) 99 N.W. 
433; Morris v. Railroad Co., (Iowa) 23 N. W. 
1-1:3 ; 11 A. & E. Ency Law ( 2d Ed.) 828. Having 
detennined that a claim for da1nages for death by 
wrongful act, under the statutes of Wyoming, 
is at least a special asset of the estate, the next 
question presented is, can the right thus given by 
the Wyo1ning statute be enforced in this juris-
diction through the 1nedium of an ad1ninistrator 
appointed by the courts of this state? This ques-
tion was squarely presented and decided by this 
court in the case of Utah Sav. & Trust Co. vs. 
Diamond Coal & Coke Co., 26 Utah, 299, 73 Pac. 
52-1:. 
'"In view of the elaborate discussion of this 
hranch of the 0ase by appellant, in its brief, we 
have again given the subject careful considera-
tion, and while there a ppe.ars to be some conflict 
in the authorities on this question, the doctrine 
declared in the case of Utah Sav. & Trust Co. v. 
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Diamond Coal & Coke Co., supra, is upheld by the 
the decided weight of authority. Morris v. Chi-
cago R. I. & P. R. Co. (Iowa) 23 N.W. 143; Stew-
art v. B. & 0. R. Co., 168 U.S. 447, 18 Sup. Ct. 105, 
42 L. Ed. 537; Dennick v. Railroad Co., 103 U. S 
11, 26 L. Ed. 439; Boston & M. R. Co. v. Hurd, 108 
Fed. 116, 4 7 C. C. A. 615, 56 L. R. A. 193; Louis-
ville & N. R.R. v. Shivell's Adrn'r (Ky.) 18 S.vV. 
944; Sargent v. Sargent (Mass.) 47 N.E. 121. It 
being admitted tl~at the proceedings leading up 
to the issuance of letters of administration to 
A. I. Stone were in accordance with the provisions 
of the statute regulating such proceedings, we are 
of the opinion, and so hold, that the District Court 
of Weber County had jurisdiction to issue said 
letters, and that it did not err in dismissing appel-
lant's petition to have them revoked." 
In Bancoft's Probate Practice, Volume 1, Chapter 
2, Section 30 page 57 it states: 
"The sole purpose of instituting probate pro-
ceedings may, however, be to obtain necessary 
authority to com1nence a suit to recover for the 
conversion of the only property of the estate, 
or a suit to set aside a conveyance 1nade by the 
testator prior to his death. And where the sole 
property of a decedent is an equitable claim, the 
court 1nay, in its discretion, treat this as property 
and grant letters of ad1ninistration. There is 
some doubt, however, as to whether the existence 
of assets is jurisdictional. ~-\ccording to the better 
vit>w, it is not~ the question is one of property and 
for the PxPreise of a sound discretion upon the 
part of the eonrt to which application is n1ade. 
\Vht>m'vt>r, at least, there is a possible right of 
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action as for wrongful death, or in re8ped of an:' 
claim or chose in Hction upon which a fair-minded 
attorney would advise a client to bring suit, it 
would seem that t;uch circumstance alone, in the 
absence of some inhibiting statute, should be and 
is sufficient to W<. rrant the assurnption of juris-
diction and the issr;.ance of letters." 
Bancroft cites as aP :hority for the statement just 
quoted the Utah cases Y:hich are cited above narnely, 
In re Lowham's Estate a:1d In re Tasanen's Estate. 
The Lowharn and T.asrnen cases have been relied upon 
and accepted as sound au):hority. The Court, of course, is 
familiar with quiet title practice in the State where an 
administrator is appointed soley for the purpose of 
showing that there was no assets in the estate but that 
due to some transaction during the life of the deceased 
there was what appeared on record to be some kind of 
an interest in property. If the existence of property is 
necessary then in the quiet title action where title is 
quieted and there is no right in the estate the appoint-
ment of the .administrator would, of course, be void and 
the action to quiet title of no effect. 
This Court, on one occasion, pointed out that sin<:u 
the appointment of an adrninistrator was largely an in 
rem action on the part of the Court that if there were 
no assets then there could be no harm done and no one 
would be hurt by the appointrnent. This particular 
aspect of the Utah Code and this Court's interpretation 
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was conrmented upon in the case of In re Lamu~tt's 
Estate, 95 Utah 219, 79 P. 2d. 649, where the following 
language indicates the principal was set forth: 
"The guardianship of a person having no 
estate would partake largely of personal ele-
Inents; but the appointlnent of a guardian solely 
for the determination of the nature and quantun1 
of an estate, like an .ad1ninistration of an estate, 
is an action in rein. Barrette v. Whitney, 36 Utah 
574, 106 P. 522, 37 L.R.A., N.S., 368. In re Estate 
of Tasanen, 25 Utah 396, 71 P. 984." 
It is submitted that in the light of the Tasanen, 
Lowhmn and Lamont c.ases there can be no doubt about 
the jurisdiction of the Probate Court to appoint an 
administrator even though there did not appear to be 
aHsets in the estate. 
B. THE EXERCISE OF SOUND DISCRETION ON THE 
PART OF THE PROBATE COURT REQUIRES THE AP-
POINTMENT OF AN ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE 
OF PHYLLIS ROSANDER LEIGH. 
A recent develop1nent in the law of autmnobiles con-
cerns the correlation of the K on-Resident :Motorists Stat-
ute, 41-12-8 U.C.A. 1953, and the survival statutes, such 
as the provisions in Section 78-11-12, U.C.A. 1953. 
An examination of the two legislative inactlnents 
would indicate that what wa~ intended was cornplete 
coverage regardle~~ of whether a person lived or died 
or wa~ a rt>~ident or a non-resident of the State of Utah 
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if injury was eaused within lTtah by his negligence then 
the injured person would be entitled to recover within 
this State for such injuries. 
The correlation of the two statutes has caused con-
~iderable concern in other states, but it is respectfully 
sub1nitted, should not cause difficulty here. The cases 
rited in the preceding sub point would indi0ate that it 
is not necess.ary for a deceased person to have estate 
within the State of Utah in order for an administrator 
to be appointed. 
It is respectfully sub1nitted that the problem sug-
gests itself to the practical sense of the Court to carry 
out the Legislative intention. Two decisions which have 
solved the practical problmn of the appoinhnent of the 
administrator .and the bringing of an action in the State 
where the accident causing injury has occurred are In r0 
V'ilas' Estate, 166 Ore. 115, 110 P. 2d, 940, and In re 
Fagin's Estate, ____ Iow.a ____ 66 N.W. 2d, 920. 
The Iowa Supre1ne Court considered at length at-
tempb by an ad1ninistrator to bring before the court 
the facts that there was a policy of indemnity insurance 
and by wh01n the insurance policy had been issued. This 
difficulty with which the Iowa court w.as concerned has 
been eliu1inated in our case. There has been presented 
a copy of the inde1nnity agree1nent between the insur-
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ance cmnpany and the deceased. 
The Suprerne Court of Iowa set forth in its decision 
the cmnmon sense and practical solution to the problem 
which is now before this court. The one basic fact that 
the Supreme Court of Iowa did not have before it was 
the contractual obligation on the part of the insuranre 
company to defend the deceased or her estate in every 
State of the rnion and to appear on her behalf and to 
hold her harrnless against judgment which might be 
entered in any State of the Union. This particular fact 
it is subrnitted is of extreme in1portance and should be 
considered by the court in arriving at a fair and equi-
table decision. Even without that fact before it the Iowa 
court came to a conclusion that the administrator should 
be appointed within the State of Iowa and that legal 
actions could properly be cmnrnenced against him there 
where the accident had occurred. 
Its decision and reasoning which 1s 1n several re-
spects sin1ilar to the principles which have been set down 
by our Utah Suprerne Court in the Tasanen estate case 
is as follows: 
•· (10) VII. Finally, it should be renlem-
bered that proceedings such as are involved here, 
seeking the appoinbnent of adrninistrators, are 
not adversary nor personal. They are special 
proceedings in rern. 33 C.J.S. Executors and 
Adn1inistrators, Sec. 50; 21 ~-\m. Jur., Executors 
and Adn1inistrators, Sec. 1~. The legality of the 
.appointruent is not dependent upon acquiring 
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personal jurisdiction of any non-resident by per-
sonal or substituted service. 
"This is nut an action against a non-resident 
such as Inight have been brought against 1fr. Fa-
gin had he survived the collision in which the 
Pilgers clai1n the:, were injured. Nor is it an 
action against the ad1ninistrator of Mr. Fagin' d 
estate in Illinois. The Legislation .assuming to 
Inake such actions possible is in no way involved 
here. 
"The Iowa ad1uinistrator has jurisdiction only 
of whatever property of the estate may be in 
Iowa. If it shall develop there is none, or that 
Pilger's have no enforceable claims, decedent's 
general estate represented by appellant will have 
suffered no loss. Nor will appellant and the 
estate he represents suffer any da1nage if the 
Pilger clai1ns be established. Appellee (Iowa ad-
ministrator) will have recourse only .against the 
Iowa property, viz., whatever insurance coverage 
decedent carried on his automobile subject to 
such clai1ns. No one clai1ns any other property 
is threatened. 
"In ultinmte effect appellant is not the real 
party in interest. The real p.arty is the insurance 
company and the real issue whether it must de-
fend in Iowa where the collision occurred, or in 
decedent's hmne jurisdiction where there is pend-
ing general adrninistration on his estate. 
"A consideration of the entire record con-
vinces us the decision of the trial court must be 
affinned and it is so ordered." 
This Court has clearl:r recognized that the right 
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of a plaintiff to choo~e the place of trial is a substantial 
right and when he choose.s as his forum place where the 
accident occurred then all of the reasons and considera-
tions behind the venue statutes and the doctrine of forum 
non conveniens should apply. See Petersen v. Ogden 
Union Railway and Depot Co., 110 Utah 573, 175 P. 2d 
744; Mooney v. Denver and Rio Grande Western Rail-
road Co., ____ Utah ____ 221 P. 2d 628. 
POINT II 
RESPONDENT HAS COVENANTED TO DEFEND THE 
ACTION OF RAWLINKIEWICZ IN UTAH. 
One of the grounds the respondent cites in the 
petition to revoke the letters of administration is that 
the insurance cmnpany would not respond to any judg-
Inent obtained against the Estate of Leigh within the 
State of Utah. 
This contention, it i~ respectfully subn1itted, i~ with-
out any 1nerit whatsoever. The policy of insur.anee 
which covered the autonwbile driven by the deceased 
is the docuntent which will control the rights of the 
ad1ninistrator and the obligations of the respondent. The 
insurance eompany ~hould not be pennitted to say to 
this Court, as a ground for revoking the letters of ad-
ntinistration, that it will refuse to abide by and c.arry 
out it~ obligation~ solemnly undertaken in the policy. 
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rl,he insuring agreeu1ent sub-paragraph II provides 
that the insurance co1npany (a) shall defend any suit 
against the insured arising out of a use of an automobile 
and which results in bodily injury or property damage. 
Sub-paragraphs (b) and (c) of paragraph II of the 
policy at page 1 also re(1uires of the insurance company 
that it pay all bonds or preiniuins that Inay be neces-
sary and all expenses such as costs and any expenses 
such as attorney's fees, etc. This particular clause con-
tains no territorial li1nitation whatsoever and it would 
appear that these costs of defense under the contract 
would beL paid regardless of where the accident occurs. 
Clause VIII on page 2 of the policy sets forth the 
provision that the policy applies to accidents while the 
automobile is within the United States of America, its 
territories or possessions, Canada or Newfoundland, or 
even when it is being transported between ports of the 
territories named. 
A specially significant portion of the policy is found 
on page 3, paragraph numbered 8 entitled "Financial 
Responsibility Laws, Coverages A and B." 
"Such insurance as is afforded by this policy 
for bodily injury liability or property damage 
liability shall emuply with the provisions of the 
nwtor vehicle finaneial responsibility law of any 
state or province which shall be applicable with 
respect to any such liability arising out of the 
ownership, nmintenance or use of the automobile 
during the policy period, to the extent of the 
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coverage and lirnits of liability required by such 
law, but in no event in excess of the limits of 
liability stated in this policy. The insured agrees 
to reimburse the company for any payment made 
by the company which it would not have been 
obligated to make under the terms of this policy 
except for the agreement contained in this para-
graph." 
The provisions of the policy of insurance show 
beyond possible doubt that the respondent had contracted 
to defend lawsuits and to be financially responsible for 
any losses which arose out of a use of an automobile by 
deceased Leigh. 
These contractual provisions, appellant respectfully 
submits, are a cornplete answer to the allegations on 
the part of the respondent that to defend a lawsuit in 
the State of Utah brought against the Estate of Leigh 
irnposes upon respondent hardships and would be unfair 
or inequitable to it. 
Deceased paid a pre1nimn for her policy, the re-
spondent has received payment in full for the benefits 
which it agreed to provide for her. It was paid for the 
anticipated hardships .and expense which it would be 
required to incur should the accident resulting in liability 
on the part of the insured occur in a state in which the 
respondent was not qualified to do business. 
It would have been a sirnple 1natter for the respond-
ent to provide in its poliey that no suit \vould be defended 
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vxtept in states where it had qualified to do business 
and ,,·here it had a local agent who could be served with 
a smmnons. It did not so provide. It provided that it 
would afford to the insured, during her lifetime and to 
her estate upon her death, protection against clai1ns 
which would happen any place in the United States. 
Appellant respectfully sub1nits that the respondent 
having undertaken to defend actions throughout the 
lTnited States and Canada should not be permitted to 
clain1 that to perfonn its contractual obligations imposes 
a hardship upon it, that it should not be required to bear. 
POINT III 
THE LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE CAN ONLY BE SERVED 
BY PERMITTING SUIT IN UTAH ON INJURIES SUFFERED 
IN UTAH. 
This is a relatively new field of law which, it is 
respectfully sub1nitted, the Court should approach with 
an eye single to accmnplishing the purpose the Legis-
la hue had in mind. 
It is clearly established by 78-11-12 U.C.A. 1953 
that the estate of the deceased negligent person should 
be made responsible for the damage which the negli-
gence has caused. It cle.arly established as public policy 
h~.; -11-12-8 F.C.A. 1953 that non-residents should be re-
quired to defend actions arising out of automobile ac-
cidents happening within the State. The two statutes 
are in all respects cmnpatible and, it is submitted, es-
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tablish a legislative purpose of ntaking the estate~ of 
non-residents responsible in Utah for dmnages caused 
by their negligence. 
Our statutes which govern cmnparable actions are 
familiar to the Court. In them it is not necessary that 
the defendant have property in order for a personal 
representative to be appointed so that a proceeding can 
go forward. As an exan1ple, note the following statute: 
Rule 17 (b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure read 
as follows: 
"(b) INFANTS OR INCOMPETENT PER-
SONS. When an infant or an insane or incom-
petent person is a party, he must .appear either 
by his general guardian, or by a guardian ad litem 
appointed in the particular case by the court in 
which the action is pending. A guardian ad litem 
rnay be appointed in any case when it is deemed 
by the court in which the action or proceeding is 
prosecuted, expedirnt to represent the infant, in-
sane or incornpetent person in the action or pro-
ceeding, notwithstanding he may have a general 
guardian and may have appeared by him. In an 
action in rem it shall not be necessary to appoint 
a guardian ad litem for an~· unknown party who 
rnight be an infant or an incornpetent person." 
'Phe reasoning and purposes of our Non-Resident 
:Motorist Statute should be considered by the Court. Sec-
tion -t-1-l~-S lT.C.A. 1953 provides that where a non-
resident opPrah's a motor Yl'llicle within the State of 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
23 
l'tah, the oper.ation of the vehicle serves as an appoint-
ment h:, the non-re~ident of the Secretary of State of 
the State of Utah to be his true and lawful attorney 
upon whmn all legal process 1nay be served in any action 
or proceeding against the non-resident growing out of 
his use or operation of the nwtor vehicle within the State 
of Utah. 
Our legislature ha~ atte1npted to work out a systen1 
which will insure that a person injured by the negligence 
of a non-resident nwtorist can be indemnified through 
the institution of a legal action within the State of Utah. 
It is respectfully sub1nitted that the policy should be car-
ried out by Court decision when to do so is in cornplete 
harmony with established principles of law. 
The re~pondent in thi~ ca~e would have the Court 
determine that because it i~ not qualified to do business 
within the State the Court should disn1iss an action which 
has been connnenced against a non-resident whose negli-
gence has caused injury to a resident of the State of 
l'tah. vVhat difference should it Blake where the re-
spondent i~ qualified to do busine~s )? It cannot be a 
part:~ to the actions under any circun1stance. The resi-
dence of the respondent or the State where it is quali-
fied to do business is cmnpletely innnaterial. Appellant 
does not believe at thi~ ~tage of proceedings the respond-
ent even has ~uch an intere~t as to be able to object to 
the appoinhuent. Section 75-1-!--1-l: U.C.A. 1953 gr.ants 
only to parties intere~ted the right to object. But assu1n-
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ing it does have a right to object what difference can its 
place of business Inake ~ This consideration is especially 
immaterial when one considers the provisions of the 
insurance policy. 
The new N on-abatmnent Statute in the case of a 
deceased wrongdoer, the Non-resident Service Act, the 
Probate Code and Title, and the Venue Statute, 78-13-7 
U.C.A. 1953 would appear to show clearly the public 
policy of the State of Utah. The statutes establish the 
public policy which requires that a deceased wrongdoer 
shall be responsible for any damage caused by his 
negligence at the place where the damage occurred. 
The State Legislature in 1953, when it passed Sec-
tion 78-11-12, intended as the language states "that the 
person injured shall have a cause of action against the 
personal representative of the wrongdoer." The cause 
of action it created it certainly thought would be within 
the jurisdiction of the Courts of the State of Utah. It 
also semns reasonable to suppose with insurance so wide-
spread and financial responsibility so well established 
it did not envision that before such a wrongdoer could 
be responsible he n1ust have assets other than the in-
surance rights in his estate within the State of Utah. 
lf the Court should sustain the position of respond-
ent in this ntatter it would cast grave doubt upon all 
of the quiet title actions. It is sub1nitted the Court should 
follow the r.rasanen ease, supra, and the Fagin case, 
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~upra. lf there are no .assets within this State then there 
ean be no dmnage done by the appointnwnt of an ad-
ministrator. The Court in the Tasanen decision, supra, 
recognized the practical side of this problen1 and held 
that it was only for the purpose of having leg.al repre-
~entation of the deceased's estate within the jurisdiction 
of this Court that rnade necessary the appointment of 
an administrator. The smne thing is true where insane 
or minor persons who have no property are sued. 
In this case, on behalf of Leigh, it is necessary that 
within the State of Utah an administrator appear to 
protect her interests. As a practical matter the respond-
ent will be here to defend the Leigh Estate because of 
contractural obligations which it had with Leigh during 
her lifetime. 
CONCLUSIONS 
It is respectfully .subrnitted that this Court should 
reverse the action of the Trial Court in revoking and 
vacating the Letters of Adu1inistration of David K. 
\Vatkiss and should order said Court to restore said 
David K. \Vatkiss to his fonner status as the admin-
istrator of the Estate of Phyllis Ros.ander Leigh. 
Respectfully subrnitted, 
KING and HUGHES 
By Dwight L. King 
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